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Written Evidence to HM Treasury’s Digital Competition Expert Panel 
 
Anca Chirita, Durham University* 
 
Question 1: What are the emerging benefits and harms from digital markets, such as social 
media, e-commerce, search engines, and online advertising, of the tendency toward having only 
one or a small number of big firms? 
Benefits 
There are many notable benefits associated with digital markets especially for online sales and 
the delivery of a greater choice of products to remote areas where there is less competition due 
to a limited access to supply. Other benefits include the emergence of electronic payments via 
online banking and mobile devices. Indeed, a variety of retailers and businesses have greatly 
improved their online presence, offering a far better choice to consumers. Overall, one can say 
that we are experiencing a digital renaissance.1 
Harms 
There is a tendency toward higher levels of concentration in digital markets, such as social 
media (Facebook); universal search and advertising (Google), micro-blogging (Twitter), PC 
software (Microsoft), mobile devices and ecosystems (Apple), cloud computing (Amazon 
followed by Microsoft and Google), mobile operating systems (Google’s Android), data analytics 
(Google’s Hadoop, Facebook’s Acxiom provider of targeted advertising, or Datalogix for data 
extracted from loyalty cards), voice and video calls (Microsoft’s Skype), and large-scale online 
distribution (Amazon). The evolution of these platforms has been portrayed as a new form of 
‘imperialism’.2 The obvious harm to consumers is that they have less privacy, more targeted 
                                                          
*Assistant Professor of Competition Law, Durham University, Durham Law School, UK; Dr. iur. 
(Saarbrücken, Germany); Non-Governmental Adviser to the International Competition Network for the 
European Commission’s Directorate-General for Competition (Brussels, Belgium). I have nothing to 
declare regarding any actual or potential conflicts of interest and/or sources of funding to disclose related 
to companies or corporations in the digital sector, including the organisation of conferences with funding 
or speakers from the digital sector. 
1 On digital transformation and the impact of digitalisation on music, movies, TV, books, photography, the 
‘digital farm system’, i.e., Spotify’s access to 30 million songs, Netflix’s access to 3,400 movies and over 
750 TV shows and series, Amazon’s Kindle access to 700,000 book titles and so on, see Joel Waldfogel, 
Digital Renaissance: What Data and Economics Tell Us about the Future of Popular Culture (Princeton 
University Press, Princeton, 2018), 253. 
2 The present concentration level seems to have been predicted by Bellamy’s novel ‘Looking Back’ (1888), 
forecasting a world dominated by one industrial trust; see Diane Coyle, ‘Platform Dominance: The 
Shortcomings of Antitrust Policy’ in Martin Moore and Damian Tambini (eds.) Digital Dominance: The 
Power of Google, Amazon, Facebook and Apple (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2018), 57; similar to the 
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advertising, and participation in a social experiment3 that involves the large-scale accumulation 
of personal and/or sensitive data for marketing research and strategic pricing. Other problems 
are more difficult to quantify in economic terms; for example, subjective harms, such as fear of 
being surveilled, compared to more objective harms, such as the damage caused by identity 
theft, the time wasted with junk emails, or the higher prices paid due to online price 
discrimination or weaker bargaining power.4 
Key drivers of the trend towards only one or a small number of firms 
Among the key drivers of the above trend are the first market entry advantage coupled with 
pioneering innovation, an intelligent low-cost product pricing or free-of-charge business 
model,5 open source6 functionality, and/or under-cutting the prices of rivals. According to the 
theory of disruptive innovation, there is, however, a high degree of volatility of the market 
shares of such digital innovators. Classic examples of low- and high-end disruptive business 
models include Ryanair and Apple respectively, where the latter serviced consumers who were 
previously dissatisfied with the offerings of the incumbent firms.7 Other examples of low pricing 
models include mobile devices and communication services where similar business models 
offer new entrepreneurial opportunities for further disruption. Furthermore, open source is yet 
another generative source of disruptive innovation affecting cloud computing and software 
applications. The latest example of a generative technology that is easily accessible is Google’s 
Android operating system due to its potential to leverage Google’s search engine dominance on 
PCs to mobile devices, such as browsers, search engines, Play Store,8 maps, videos (YouTube), 
and GPS (Waze). Formerly, Apple offered customers an App store that was initially available 
free-of-charge and later for a small fee. However, Google undercut the latter by offering its 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
dominance of Google’s search engine, Facebook’s social network, and Twitter’s platform, see Patrick 
Barwise and Leo Watkins, ‘The Evolution of Digital Dominance: How and Why We Got to GAFA’ in Moore 
(2018), 42; James C Cooper and Joshua Wright, ‘The Missing Role of Economics in FTC Privacy Policy’ in 
Evan Selinger, Jules Polonetsky, and Omer Tene (eds.) The Cambridge Handbook of Consumer Privacy 
(Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2018), 481, who rely on estimates suggesting that 1.3 billion 
users log on to Facebook daily and 150 million on Snapchat, whilst the percentage of consumers using 
health tracking devices has doubled, and nearly half of US households have an Amazon Prime account; on 
platform imperialism, see Dal Yong Jin, Digital Platforms, Imperialism and Political Culture (Routledge, 
Taylor & Francis, New York, 2015), 38; on the American domination of platforms, see the tables on p. 54-
58. 
3 See generally Michelle N Meyer, ‘Ethical Considerations When Companies Study – and Fail to Study – 
Their Customers’ in Selinger (2018), 211; Thomas L Carson, ‘Deception and Information Disclosure in 
Business and Professional Ethics’ in George G Brenkert and Tom L Beauchamp (eds.) The Oxford 
Handbook of Business Ethics (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2010), 335; Richard A Spinello, 
‘Information Privacy’ in Brenkert (2010), 366. 
4 See Alessandro Acquisti, ‘The Economics and Behavioural Economics of Privacy’ in Julia Lane, Victoria 
Stodden, Stefan Bender and Helen Nissenbaum (eds.) Privacy, Big Data, and the Public Good: Frameworks 
for Engagement (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2014), 83 and 87. More sceptical about 
monetary damages in the context of Google’s tracking of Apple’s Safari browser, see Chris Jay Hoofnagle, 
‘The Federal Trade Commission’s Inner Privacy Struggle’ in Selinger (2018), 177; for the risk of identity 
theft arising out of the social security numbers’ loss, see Laura Brandimarte and Alessandro Acquisti, ‘The 
Economics of Privacy’ in Martin Peitz and Joel Waldfogel (eds.) The Oxford Handbook of the Digital 
Economy (2012), 558. 
5 See Ian Chaston, Internet Marketing and Big Data Exploitation (Palgrave Macmillan, 2015), 52. 
6 This is in contrast to closed platforms such as Microsoft Windows, Intel processors, Sony’s PlayStation 
game console, and, initially, Apple’s iPod and iPhone, see Chaston (2015), 109. 
7 See Chaston (2015), 3. 
8 Other alternatives are Apple’s App Store, Windows’ Phone Store, BlackBerry’ App World to name a few. 
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operating system as open source software. A final example of congruent innovation9 is 
Microsoft’s Skype for instant messaging, including voice recognition and Facebook, and 
Google+’s face recognition from a biometric database using neural network models to recognise 
individuals based on a large set of images, and microphone-enabled devices, such as Apple’s Siri 
in iPhones, Amazon’s Alexa in Echo, or Samsung’s smart TVs.10 The latter could have been 
leveraged to Microsoft’s professional network, Linked-In. 
The degree to which large market players enable or inhibit wider innovation and 
investment 
The above context proves that despite a rival having a large share of the market, it is still 
possible to overtake their business by sustained investment in research and development 
(R&D) projects, by supporting innovation, and by exploiting the advantages of a new 
technology. Innovative businesses are therefore vulnerable to new market entries, and their 
market position can be challenged.11 So far, the market has been driven by innovators and early 
adopters of innovative technologies, as consumers have largely purchased mobile devices with a 
panoply of software applications included in a bundle. It remains to be seen whether incumbent 
newcomers could attract the late majority of consumers who are not yet persuaded that such 
mobile devices are functionally workable and worth the investment. At least in theory, there is 
some potential to challenge the present dominance of early innovators. According to the ‘chasm’ 
theory of innovation,12 laggards are the ultimate consumers to be persuaded if such devices are 
sensitively priced. In any event, to attract consumers, any new incumbents would have to 
sustain major investments in R&D13 and undercut the existing pricing alternatives. To date, 
there are not many such scenarios. For example, UK’s Arm Holdings14 is one particular case 
where the former overtook Intel by covering a distinct consumer demand for new chips for 
mobile devices. 
Harms associated with concentration in digital markets 
An obvious harm to consumers is that they have to cover for any failed R&D costs where the 
new technologies prove workable only for a short period of time due to inherent failures in the 
hard- or software and to the race for more innovation, e.g., a new version of the operating 
system to which the mobile hardware cannot be upgraded and, as a result, consumers are no 
longer satisfied with a slow device. A major harm is that new technologies, such as PCs, mobile 
                                                          
9 See Chaston (2015), 103. 
10 Some argue that Google has been analysing G-mails since 2007 and that many Android phones have 
been able to see and hear people since 2008; see Robert Epstein, ‘Manipulating Minds: The Power of 
Search Engines to Influence Votes and Opinions’ in Moore (2018), 310; Mark MacCarthy, ‘In Defence of 
Big Data Analytics’ in Selinger (2018), 50; Yana Welinder and Aeryn Palmer, ‘Face Recognition, Real-Time 
Identification, and Beyond’ in Selinger (2018), 103; Alvaro M Bedoya, ‘Algorithmic Discrimination vs. 
Privacy Law’ in Selinger (2018), 233; Woodrow Hartzog, Privacy’s Blueprint: The Battle to Control the 
Design of New Technologies (Harvard University Press, Massachusetts, 2018), 248, where voice 
recognition may capture personal and/or sensitive data, which are transmitted to third parties through 
sensor-enabled devices. 
11 See Chaston (2015), 49 and 50, who offers the example of the video game console industry where Sega, 
Nintendo, Sony, and Microsoft had been leading the market for a while only to be overtaken by McPhee 
and Nuttall. 
12 See Chaston (2015), 73. 
13 See Clayton M Christensen, The Innovator’s Dilemma (Boston, Massachusetts, Harvard Business School 
Press, 1997). 
14 See Chaston (2015), 100. 
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devices, and so on, do not cover for the costs related to the short life span of such products and 
the emergent environmental waste. These manufacturers do not assume any responsibility for 
recycling, passing the responsibility for and cost of recycling on to the consumers, which is 
unacceptable. Businesses make larger profits, so they should assume responsibility for their fair 
share of environmental protection given that it is their inefficiency in the first instance, due to 
failed innovation coupled with dynamic competition for better innovation, which contributes 
directly to such environmental waste. 
Question 2: What are the emerging benefits and harms of the same number of digital firms 
having a presence across a broad range of digital markets? 
Benefits 
Consumers are often the beneficiaries of a smart bundling of more than one product together 
for the purpose of a functional installation and the smooth running of the overall technology, 
including hard-and software functionalities on both PCs and mobile devices. On the contrary, on 
PCs and tablets, consumers have to purchase expensive licensing fees for Microsoft’s software, 
including Word, Excel, PowerPoint, and so on, whilst having Mac or Linux as alternatives. 
Harms  
A. The extent to which the same number of digital firms have a presence across a broad 
range of digital markets 
This could imply an actual and real potential to leverage dominant market power from one 
market to other adjacent markets, for example, Microsoft’s leveraging of its market dominance 
in the Windows operating system to other markets, i.e., its Explorer browser or Media Player; 
Google’s leveraging of its dominant position in the markets for a universal search engine on PCs 
and for the Android operating system on mobile devices to compare shopping advertising and 
for its Play Store, browser, search engine, maps, and videos respectively; Facebook’s leveraging 
of its dominant position in the market for social media advertising to instant communications, 
including texts, calls, and video messages (WhatsApp), and photo-and video sharing (Instagram) 
markets; and Amazon’s dominant position in the market for online distribution to cloud 
computing, logistics, and so on.  
B. The key drivers of this cross-market presence 
The consolidation of a dominant market position is not an inherent feature of the multi-sided 
business model of such digital platforms, where one platform service is devised to attract users 
and is therefore entirely free of charge,15 whilst the other is designed to extract revenues from 
the sharing of personal or sensitive data to third parties, including advertisers and data 
analytics. It is often the result of mergers and acquisitions of many innovative start-up 
businesses. As a result of such market consolidation, there is less competition and less choice 
                                                          
15 Such offers are on a ‘take-it-or-leave-it basis’ in exchange for data, see Acquisti (2014), 87, but that data 
can be sold, not only shared, see Jennifer Barrett, ‘Data Brokers: Should They Be Reviled or Revered?’ in 
Selinger (2018), 36; on multi-sided software platforms such as Apple’s iPod, iPad and iPhone versus 
Google’s Android, see Andrei Hagiu, ‘Software Platforms’ in Peitz (2012), 65; on two-sided markets, see 
Alex Gaudeul and Bruno Jullien, ‘E-commerce, two-sided markets and info-mediation’ in Eric Brousseau 
and Nicolas Curien, Internet and Digital Economics: Principles, Methods and Applications (Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge, 2007), 269. 
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available in the respective market segments. While the start-ups acquired following a merger 
become an integral part of a larger corporation, it cannot be assumed that the dominant 
platform will continue to prioritise the R&D projects that defined the former. A few examples 
are offered by the decline of quality evidenced by Microsoft’s Explorer or Linked-In services, 
Google’s Scholar citations finding service, or its subsequent versions of Android on mobile 
devices. 
One expectation of this cross-market presence has been that the data leveraged from one side of 
the service platform to the other is ‘non-rivalrous’ and that it should be made accessible to other 
competitors. For example, the European Commission’s Communication on ‘Building a European 
data economy’16 aims to improve access to anonymous machine-generated data through the 
sharing of data from larger to small- and medium-sized businesses (SMEs) in order to protect 
investments and assets and to minimise the lock-in effect on SMEs. In this context, notable 
examples include the data captured by sensors in modern farms or traffic lights to improve 
harvesting or traffic management. Other sectors include transportation, energy markets, smart 
living, and healthcare. The above expectation, however, remains unrealistic, as the new General 
Data Protection Regulation 679/2016 demands that the data be used solely for the specific 
purpose for which it had been collected so as to pursue the principle of data minimisation.17 It 
appears fallacious to rely on the premise that access to data has to be the norm where 
businesses granted such access would, for example, use artificial intelligence software to engage 
in anti-competitive algorithmic coordination.18 In other words, the exclusionary market-
foreclosure-effect test used by competition authorities needs adaptation to the new regulatory 
regime applicable to competition rules under the prohibition of abuse of a dominant position 
and merger control.  
It is also useful to recall that the above regulation sets out a lower threshold of corporate 
compliance than most competition law scholars expect. Most companies and/or corporations 
are easily able to tick the data protection check-list provided that the users of online platforms 
have agreed to the privacy terms or conditions, in particular, the sharing of their economic data 
to third parties, i.e., data brokers, advertisers, retailers, and so on; and the data harvested from 
that platform is anonymised. The two pressing problems can be summarised as follows: (i) such 
users do not have any choice but to agree to those unfair terms and conditions imposed by a 
                                                          
16 See the Commission’s Communication to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Social and 
Economic Committee and the Committee of the Regions, COM (2017) 9 final, ‹https://eur-
lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52017DC0009&from=EN›; sharing such data with 
smaller competitors raises the issue of the IP protection of the data, see Wolfgang Kerber, ‘Rights on Data: 
The EU Communication ‘Building a European Data Economy’ from an Economic Perspective’ in  Sebastian 
Lohsse/Reiner Schulze/Dirk Staudenmayer (eds.) Trading Data in the Digital Economy: Legal Concepts 
and Tools Münster Colloquia on EU Law and the Digital Economy III (Nomos, Hart Publishing, 2017), 116; 
sceptical about the Commission’s Communication due to the tension between data protection and data 
economy, since of interest to the latter will be solely personal data, see Christiane Wendehorst, ‘Of 
Elephants in the Room and Paper Tigers: How to Reconcile Data Protection and the Data Economy’ in 
Lohsse (2017), 328; 331. For example, anonymised data may become personal due to a subsequent 
combination of datasets. 
17 The latter calls for businesses to limit their collection of data, see Mark MacCarthy, ‘In Defence of Big 
Data Analytics’ in Selinger (2018), 56; for the opinion that the risk of unlawfulness of big data processing 
is higher, see Irene Kamara and Paul De Hert, ‘Balancing and the Controller’s Legitimate Interest’ in 
Selinger (2018), 347. 
18 See Josef Drexl, ‘On the Future EU Legal Framework for the Digital Economy: A Competition-based 
Response to the ‘Ownership and Access’ Debate’ in Lohsse (2017), 240-242. 
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dominant platform or else leave the platform; and (ii) where category price discrimination 
happens, the economic harm to consumers is invisible to most consumers, and even for 
competition authorities, it may be difficult to detect or quantify the harm caused. In addition, 
the traditional focus on the exclusion of those rivals that cannot access the same data is 
misleading, as the digital context requires a reversal of focus on the exploitation of consumers. 
Thus, the latter, too, fails to always and reliably quantify harm other than by showing a 
detectable price change prior to data collection as opposed to the situation where the economic 
data about consumers becomes available to third parties. For consumers, it is difficult to even 
try to identify the corporate circle of third parties that capture their data. These consumers are 
captive due to such information asymmetries about their own data. 
Question 3: What effect can the accumulation and concentration of data within a small number 
of big firms be expected to have on competition? 
Depending on the type and size of the digital platform, the accumulation of large-scale data 
raises significant concerns for the economics of privacy, i.e., targeted advertising,19 and for the 
strategic exploitation of consumers, i.e., through product pricing. 
Briefing on the Internet’s Architecture on Digital Platforms 
Digital platform Transactions Internet service Business model Data 
E-commerce: brick-
and-mortar 
businesses with an 
online presence, 
retailers, banks, 
furniture stores, 
hotels, airlines, 
insurance, credit, 
mortgages and so 
on.20 
Online payments: 
debit or credit card 
companies 
Primary For profit Financial 
payments data 
securely stored 
and used for 
predictive 
analytics. Many 
online 
businesses 
offer loyalty 
cards to their 
customers. 
Social/professional 
media/search 
engines and so on 
Online activities Secondary Free of charge, but 
subsidised21 by 
targeted 
advertising and 
the sharing of data 
to third parties. 
Personal 
and/or 
sensitive data 
used for large-
scale big data 
analytics. 
Software operating 
systems 
Functionality Delivery systems Open source or 
licensing fees 
Data may be 
used for 
analytics, too. 
Hardware Functionality Access devices 
(PCs, tablets, 
mobiles) 
For profit Unknown if 
chips include 
monitoring 
devices, such as 
face or voice 
recognition.22 
 
                                                          
19 See the Commission’s Justice and Consumers’ study, which identified that in the EU28, more than two 
thirds (71%) of the respondents have experienced targeted advertising. 
20 Chaston (2015), 25. 
21 For the conclusion that in two-sided platforms, prices involve some form of cross-subsidy, see Bruno 
Jullien, ‘Two-Sided B to B Platforms’ in Peitz (2012), 180. 
22 For example, Nike is known to have included a GPS sensor feature in its footwear. 
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All of the above business platforms collect financial data securely, as it is necessary for the 
processing of online payments. Large retailers, such as supermarkets (Tesco, Sainsbury’s, Marks 
& Spencer etc.), and many others, such as Wayfair for furniture and household products, B&Q 
for gardening, airlines, hotels, and so on, which are also dominating local, regional, or 
neighbouring markets, offer loyalty cards23 that enable them to offer personalised offers to 
customers, such as discounts or promotional campaigns, and to exploit their well-known 
preferences. Regulatory efforts to prevent retailers from asking for their customers’ home 
address when using their credit cards have been fully exploited by data brokers.24 The latter 
derived the same personal data by asking for the telephone number. When they were prohibited 
from asking for the phone number, data brokers collected the postal code used to identify the 
home address. 
Building upon my previous research on ‘The Rise of Big Data’, I can highlight the existence of a 
two-tier system of micro- and large-scale (big) data analytics.25 All companies that dominate 
local or neighbouring markets collect data at a micro-scale level for the purpose of predictive 
analytics, such as linear, including decision trees, vector, and cluster modelling.26 They use geo-
demographic variables, such as income, age, and so on, and behavioural data to predict the 
target’s willingness to buy a particular product. Major retailers attempt to test their customers’ 
willingness to make certain purchases. Regularly, credit-rating companies use sample modelling 
to test the probability of fraud; insurance companies for the probability of claims; life insurance 
companies to estimate life expectancy; banks for the probability of a mortgage’s voluntary 
foreclosure;27 and so on. However, given the limited size of the sample, such predictive analytics 
may not prove accurate. In contrast, large-scale corporations that possess or harvest a large 
amount of big data may inter alia use raw data from the unstructured content of emails or the 
web for data mining purposes; machine-generated data, such as logs or mobile applications;28 
statistical software packages, such as IBM, Stata, Rapid Minder, Google’s open source software, 
                                                          
23 Datalogix tracks the on- and off-line purchasing patterns of consumers from the use of their loyalty 
cards; based credit card usage, loyalty cards and sales data, the Electronic Data Interchange uses 
automated data analysis to identify trends and customers’ different needs, see Chaston (2015), 45. 
24 See Hartzog (2018), 74. 
25 See Anca D Chirita, ‘The Rise of Big Data and the Loss of Privacy’ in Mor Bakhoum et al. (eds.) Personal 
Data in Competition, Consumer Protection and Intellectual Property Law, MPI Studies on Intellectual 
Property and Competition Law (Springer, Berlin-Heidelberg, 2018), 153 ff. and 173 on the collection of 
data, which is well-supported by the recent findings of the Commission’s Justice and Consumers: 
‘Consumer market study on online market segmentation through personalised pricing/offers in the 
European Union’ (June 2018) ‹https://ec.europa.eu/info/publications/consumer-market-study-online-
market-segmentation-through-personalised-pricing-offers-european-union_en›, including evidence from 
stakeholder surveys proving the collection of personal socio-demographic data, behavioural data, 
technical, and sensitive data. 
26 See the Commission’s Justice and Consumers’ study, cited above, which identified that online traders 
use specialised companies’ personalisation or data sharing; on clustering as a popular data mining 
technique, see Steven Finlay, Predictive Analytics, Data Mining, and Big Data: Myths, Misconceptions and 
Methods (Palgrave Macmillan, 2014), 120, who argued that predictive analytics does not require ‘big 
data’, but a few hundred examples of the behaviour expected to be predicted, 143; clustering algorithms 
may be used to establish micro-segments by identifying individuals who display similar mobility patterns, 
see Arvind Sathi, Engaging Customers Using Big Data: How Marketing Analytics Are Transforming Business 
(Palgrave Macmillan, 2014), 56. 
27 See Finlay (2014), 53. 
28 Finlay (2014), 15; Barwise and Watkins (2018), 28. 
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Apache Hadoop,29 Revolution, and so on; and automated data that is a mix of data-driven and 
expert-derived rules to analyse big data.30 Software packages act as intelligent agents that allow 
for quick automation31 and processing of big data analytics. 
With the help of the quantitative and statistical analysis of big data, it is, however, possible to 
accurately measure the consumers’ willingness to pay for particular products,32 determine the 
elasticity of demand in response to price changes,33 observe trends in the life cycle of a product, 
identify under-performing products, and categorise customers. While the micro-scale 
behavioural modelling of data serves for the analysis and prediction of the risks associated with 
the use of targeted advertising and promotional campaigns, when the same modelling is being 
applied at a large-scale level to forecast customers’ demand, to predict product trends, and to 
make strategic pricing recommendations, the latter inevitably becomes part of a wider social 
experiment of intensive platform monitoring and data sharing with data analytics companies. 
Due to the size of the sample of participants due to be observed, the latter forecasts tend to be 
even more accurate and to reliably inform producers of estimated demand and future pricing 
options. I would argue that no marketing research harms consumers as long as the sample of 
the targeted consumers remains meaningful, but limited for a specific purpose. Otherwise, big 
data analytics is a perfect substitute for direct or indirect exchanges of strategic information 
regarding actual or future pricing methods; estimated demand; consumers’ preferences, 
location, investment; and so much more.  
However, larger companies or corporations are in a stronger position to extract strategic data 
that can later be exploited tactically, i.e., through targeted advertising, and strategically, by 
informing the price setting mechanism. Instead of a business-to-business exchange of 
information (B2B: ‘hub and spoke’ conspiracy), this large-scale marketing experiment moves on 
to the prospective consumers (B2C: track-and-monitor conspiracy). In my opinion, this 
phenomenon, which I have previously identified as a track-and-monitor conspiracy on the basis 
of consumers’ geographical location; socio-economic demographics, i.e., income status; and 
behavioural data, i.e., preferences and interests, allows for a pricing conspiracy to be 
implemented with the help of consumers rather than competitors. For example, consumers 
identified as living in remote areas, i.e., the Highlands or small islands, usually have less choice 
and can therefore be charged more for other terms and conditions, such as transportation costs. 
Knowing consumers’ category of income, businesses can more accurately predict their 
reservation price in terms of bargaining. It is similar to a meeting of minds between the buyer 
and the seller, where the latter knows how much the former is able to potentially spend. Finally, 
younger consumers who use mobile devices that are less secure for e-payments may be more 
likely to be targeted by scammers, but this issue could be left to other fields of law, such as 
                                                          
29 Named after the elephant toy of its founder’s son, Hadoop is a tool used to store massive amounts of 
data, within the range of peta- or terabytes, for quick processing, see Finlay (2014), 200 and 206; Carl 
Landwehr, ‘Engineered Controls for Dealing with Big Data’ in Julie Lane et al. (eds.) (2014), 229, as well as 
the risks associated with cloud computing especially for universities and other research institutions. 
30 Finlay (2014), 63. 
31 Chaston (2015), 211. 
32 Finlay (2014), 27. 
33 Chaston (2015), 129. 
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information technology law and/or cyber/internet laws on fraud and computer related 
crimes.34 
As has more recently been shown, the effect of ‘personalised’ pricing is perhaps less harmful 
than some scholars or policymakers have thought; thus it raises concerns about fairness and 
discrimination.35 It is, however, not to be under-estimated when it comes to smaller online 
traders that have no business reputation to lose, and the impact of small, but significant price 
increases on individual consumers are still likely to be felt. Several examples include online 
furniture stores, airlines, or hotels whose pricing may be subject to change depending on the 
tracked location of a particular and/or returning customer. Based on personal experience with 
such traders, Furniture Village,36 Victorian Fireplaces, Air France/KLM, and several lesser 
known furniture stores have successfully engaged in personalised pricing. In contrast, smaller 
but reputable family-owned businesses displaying high-to low-end pricing methods, such as 
Brights of Nettlebed, Anderson Bradshaw, Lock, Stock & Barrel, Oak Furniture Land, and 
Furniture Choice, and seeking to attract new customers, have not engaged in personalised 
pricing.37 Hotel providers are notorious for a pre-fixed, i.e., advance booking model, which is 
cheaper without cancellation, and more dynamic, i.e., excessive pricing, close to a booking’s 
proximity. Airline companies adopt pricing models similar to those applicable to unfilled hotel 
rooms whereby unsold plane seats are considered to be ‘perishable’.38 
                                                          
34 Generally Ian J Lloyd, Information Technology Law (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 8th ed., 2017), 237; 
Chaston (2015), who argues that older people use mobile phones to a lesser extent than younger people, 
162; thus, government regulations on mobile surveillance have been too slow to catch up with the speed 
of the new technology, see Kirsten Martin and Katie Shilton, ‘How Privacy Is Respected in Mobile Devices’ 
in Selinger (2018), 91. 
35 See Lina M Khan, ‘Amazon – An Infrastructure Service and Its Challenge to Current Antitrust Law’ in 
Moore (2018), 110, footnote 9 relying on journalists; Christopher Townley, Eric Morrison, and Karen 
Yeung, ‘Big Data and Personalised Price Discrimination in EU Competition Law’, KCL Law School Research 
Paper 38/2017; thus, personalised pricing could fall under the consumer-protection function of 
competition law; cf. Orla Lynskey, ‘The Power of Providence: The Role of Platforms in Leveraging the 
Legibility of Users to Accentuate Inequality’ in Moore (2018), 182, who rightfully argues that advertisers 
have ‘little interest in the actual identity of an individual’; MacCarthy, (2018), 61, recalling the efforts 
made by policy-makers, i.e. the Obama’s administration report on big data and its discriminatory use in 
credit, employment, education, and criminal justice, see the Executive Office of the President, ‘Big Data: A 
Report on Algorithmic Systems, Opportunity, and Civil Rights’ (May 2016), 
‹https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/microsites/ostp/2016_0504_data_discrimina
tion.pdf›. 
36 Furniture Village added 6% on top of the initial online price to returning customers based on location 
tracking. The remedy was using a different PC. 
37 As has been highlighted elsewhere, there is ‘no real’ evidence of widespread personalised price 
discrimination, see Diane Coyle, ‘Platform Dominance: The Shortcomings of Antitrust Policy’ in Moore 
(2018), 58; on the lack of empirical evidence about the harms caused by privacy, see James C Cooper and 
Joshua Wright, ‘The Missing Role of Economics in FTC Privacy Policy’ in Selinger (2018), 481; Lynskey, 
cited above, 183 for the reluctance to use personalized prices for fear of ‘consumer backlash’; Chaston 
(2015), 195, arguing that well-known online suppliers are more trusted than new or smaller companies. 
More recently, the Commission’s Justice and Consumers’ market study, cited above, found that three fifths 
of around 160 e-commerce websites, i.e., 61%, have engaged in personalised pricing. 
38 See the Commission’s Justice and Consumers’ market study which has identified airline and booking 
websites as evidencing a higher level of personalised pricing; Chaston (2015), 130; see Arvind Sathi, 
Engaging Customers Using Big Data: How Marketing Analytics Are Transforming Business (Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2014), 119, referring to Bing, Travelocity, or Priceline’s offerings of dynamic pricing to 
customers; otherwise, such airlines deals would remain unsold. 
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However, the anti-competitive effects of the large-scale accumulation of customers’ data for the 
purpose of price discrimination and classification of customers subject to different groups or 
categories, rather than personalised discrimination, based on their location, socio-economic 
status, and individual preferences and interests, can no longer be ignored as a B2C track and 
monitor conspiracy on customers’ expectations of prices, demand, and future preferences. 
Overall, there is evidence of consensus in the academic literature to suggest that in digital 
markets, the large-scale collection of data and its analytics represents a real and legitimate 
concern regarding the exploitation of consumers.39  
Based on a pragmatic approach to personalised and group pricing, the digital product markets 
worthy of being prioritised for scrutiny of data analytics by the UK Competition and Markets 
Authority are, after residential mortgages, house contents, such as furniture and electronic 
appliances; cars, including rentals; bathroom and kitchen fittings; and gardening. Compared to 
everyday food purchases, the former are the most expensive products followed by holiday 
travel, so that the effects of price discrimination based on big data analytics is likely to be felt 
harder by consumers. 
In contrast, intermediation networks, such as social media, are regarded as more suitable for 
‘sentiment’ analysis of trends, forecasting the growth of customer numbers, and for testing the 
eventual success of targeted advertising, whereas the latter is reportedly more effective only 
where there are shopping alternatives locally available.40 In view of its large audience, Facebook 
is regarded as a ‘megaphone’ for channelling marketing messages to customers;41 a magnet for 
persuading customers to interact with ads; and a monitoring tool of customers active on this 
platform. 
                                                          
39 See Barwise and Watkins, (2018), 25, arguing in favour of technology-specific regulation of platforms, 
45; on platforms as a new way of coordinating supply and demand, see Coyle (2018), 52; Barrett (2018), 
who lists the risk of potential discrimination of customers as being second only to the security risk posed 
by data brokers, 44; for the view that the public does not understand privacy policies and the risk of 
tracking technologies, see Joseph Turrow, ‘Americans and Marketplace Privacy’ in Selinger (2018), 160; 
Julie Brill, ‘The Intersection of Privacy and Consumer Protection’ in Selinger (2018), 363, urging 
companies using scoring models to do more to determine whether their own data analytics result in 
‘unfair, unethical, or discriminatory effects on consumers’. On the economics of price discrimination 
effects on consumers based on their purchasing history, see Drew Fudenberg and J Miguel Villas-Boas, 
‘Price Discrimination in the Digital Economy’ in Peitz (2012), 255, where firms with significant market 
power can only benefit from such data; thus, it can also intensify competition for data amongst rivals; 
Ariel Ezrachi and Maurice E Stucke, Virtual Competition: The Promise and Perils of the Algorithm-Driven 
Economy (Harvard University Press, Massachussetts, 2016), 101; Maurice E Stucke and Allen P Grunes, 
Big Data and Competition Policy (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2016), 51 ff.; The UK’s competition 
authority (CMA) has recently endorsed personalised price discrimination for smaller businesses and 
price discrimination based on categorisation for larger corporations, see Competition & Markets 
Authority, ‘Pricing algorithms: Economic working paper on the use of algorithms to facilitate collusion 
and personalised pricing’, CMA 94, 8 October 2018, 
‹https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/7
46353/Algorithms_econ_report.pdf›. 
40 Chaston (2015), 37 and 153; cf. Ari Ezra Waldman, Privacy as Trust: Information Privacy for an 
Information Age (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2018), 62, evidencing how invasive of privacy 
Facebook’s targeted advertising is, in particular, its ‘profoundly invasive’ mass-aggregation and analysis 
of data. 
41 Chaston (2015), 152. 
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Both targeted advertising and price discrimination are potentially harmful to consumers. While 
the former may be targeted by the CMA using its consumer-protection function, the latter 
remains an acute competition concern. 
Hub & Spoke 
Traditional 
Conspiracy: B2B 
Dividing Markets Allocating 
Customers 
Actual or Future 
Price 
Information 
Future Demand 
and Trends 
Track & Monitor 
Atypical 
Conspiracy: B2C 
Geo-tracking of 
location data 
Price 
discrimination on 
the basis of 
categories of 
customers 
Socio-economic 
demographic 
data, i.e., 
income/salary 
data, past history 
of online 
purchases, loyalty 
cards etc. 
Behavioural data, 
e.g., consumers’ 
interests, likes and 
preferences. 
Action New non-tracking 
rules42 applicable 
to all (see EU Geo-
blocking 
Regulation 
302/2018)43 or 
only to dominant 
online traders 
Non-sharing of 
data from one 
platform or 
provider to 
another. 
Compliance with 
the General Data 
Protection 
Regulation 
679/2016. 
Non-sharing of 
data from one 
lender or online 
retailer to another. 
New rules on 
monitoring large-
scale marketing 
research of 
customers’ data 
analytics. 
Educating online 
consumers 
regarding the 
potential 
consequences 
when using social 
networking 
platforms through 
CMA’s consumer-
protection 
function. 
Required level Article 101 
TFEU/Chapter 1 
Prohibition of the 
UK Competition 
Act 1998 
Consumer 
protection for 
targeted 
advertising 
including mobile 
payments and 
online sales. 
Article 102 
TFEU/Chapter 2 
Prohibition of the 
UK Competition 
Act 1998 
Extension of the 
prohibition of 
discrimination to 
online products 
provided free of 
charge. 
Article 102 
TFEU/Chapter 2 
Prohibition of the 
UK Competition 
Act 1998 
New form of abuse 
of big data 
analytics. 
Ex-ante tools, e.g., 
conditional 
remedies under 
the EU Merger 
Control Regulation 
139/2004 and the 
UK Enterprise and 
Regulatory Reform 
Act 2013 
 
While the traditional understanding of a ‘hub-and spoke’ conspiracy in B2B markets can be 
adapted to consider a track-and-monitor conspiracy in B2C digital markets, there is a need for a 
more paternalistic approach to online price discrimination based on tracking engaged in by all 
online traders, irrespective of whether they are dominant or not, similar to the EU Regulation 
302/2018 on Geo-tracking. At the same time, there is a need for consideration of a new type of 
anti-competitive abuse by dominant digital platforms that engage in the sharing and monitoring 
                                                          
42 Exceptions to this rule could be permitted where tracking is of the essence of the services, e.g., a GPS 
navigator or maps system. 
43 Adopted on 28 February 2018; entered into force on 3 December 2018; and based on airline 
companies’ tracking of customers: Regulation 302/2018, OJ L 60 I/1 [2018] addresses unjustified online 
sales discrimination based on customers’ nationality, place of residence or place of establishment within 
the internal market  
‹https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32018R0302&from=EN› For the US 
‘Do Not Track’ legislative proposals, see Aleecia M McDonald, ‘Stakeholders and High Stakes: Standards 
for DNT’, in Selinger (2018), 256. 
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of large-scale marketing research through analytics of customers’ data by third parties known 
as data brokers,44 as highlighted in the above table. While such marketing research is indeed 
useful for better planning and for manufacturing on demand to avoid over-production and 
environmental waste, it is simply unethical to intensely monitor consumers for the sole purpose 
of price gauging based on their personal economic status, interests, or preferences. It is 
unacceptably similar to a ‘Big Brother surveillance’ economic experiment45 on consumers who 
are isolated from the real intentions of businesses regarding the latter’s strategic pricing 
decisions. 
Question 4: What is the economic impact of the acquisition of smaller firms with relatively 
small market shares by much larger ones and is this different in the digital space than in other 
sectors? 
In my previous research,46 I examined several acquisitions by digital monopolists such as 
Google (Double Click), Microsoft (Yahoo Search, Skype and LinkedIn), Facebook (WhatsApp) 
and others which – with the exception of Hutchinson 3G UK/Telefonica UK – have 
unconditionally been cleared by the Commission. The economic impact of the acquisition of 
innovative companies involved in monitoring traffic and serving targeted advertising, search 
engine, professional networks as well as instant messaging has been significant due to the 
combination of users’ data analytics from one platform to another. For example, Google 
acquired DoubleClick’s customers, i.e., advertisers and publishers; Facebook acquired 
WhatsApp’s customers’ phone numbers and therefore their home addresses; and Microsoft 
acquired LinkedIn’s large database of professional contacts. In the majority of these cases, the 
acquisition of new datasets was not consistently looked at from the perspective of potential 
harm to users, and in any event, the economic implications for their privacy had been 
overlooked. This is because privacy has been interpreted too broadly, and it has not been 
limited to an economic construct that is able to capture the harm caused to consumers through 
the acquisition of more data and the combination of such data. In addition, some of these 
acquisitions have either disappeared (Yahoo Search) or declined in quality (LinkedIn). The 
theory of harm put forward in Facebook/WhatsApp and Google/DoubleClick was largely based 
on the exclusionary effects of the combination of the respective customers’ databases.47 The 
justification for the dismissal of consumer harm was that a lot of valuable advertising data was 
not in Facebook’s ‘exclusive’ control and that other market players, too, collect the same kind of 
data. The argument based on a meeting-competition defence grounded on data analytics is not a 
plausible one. However, in Microsoft/LinkedIn, the same line of argument, namely, that other 
companies have access to comparable data, had been reiterated. This demonstrates that 
competition authorities need to adapt the exclusionary test and define a narrower economic 
concept of privacy that is inclusive of consumer harm. 
                                                          
44 Data brokers include general marketing data, lead generation services and large advertising websites 
including social media and search engines, see Barrett (2018), 30. 
45 Initially, Big Brother had been conceived to test how people coped with surveillance, but has later 
shifted to entertainment, see Sarah E Igo, The Known Citizen: A History of Privacy in Modern America 
(Harvard University Press, Massachusetts, 2018), 362. 
46 See Anca D Chirita, ‘Data-Driven Mergers under EU Competition Law’ in John Linarelli and Orkun Akseli 
(eds.) The Future of Commercial Law: Ways Forward for Harmonisation (Hart Publishing, Oxford, 2019), 
‹https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3199912›. 
47 Ibid., 35. 
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Question 5: To what extent is it relevant for any identified benefits and harms that consumers 
receive ‘free’ services, paid for through their data? How does this affect competition in 
associated markets, such as the market for online advertising? 
We have come a long way from the direct exchange of goods for other goods to cash, the 
acceptance of plastic cards and disruptive technologies that store payment card data, such as m-
wallets, to the recognition of data as money or even as the new currency of the digital 
economy.48 In its Google Shopping decision, the Commission endorsed the latter since ‘users do 
not pay a monetary consideration of the use of general search services; they contribute to the 
monetisation of the service by providing data with each query’. The alternative to free services 
is subscription-based platforms; it is, however, uncertain whether by paying a premium 
subscription, such platforms would also cease the collection of relevant data. As long as such 
platforms continue to attract users, advertising will bring in revenues. 
Question 6: How do technologies such as artificial intelligence (AI) and machine learning affect 
competition, and what are their implications for competition policy? Does algorithmic pricing 
raise new concerns about competition? 
As has been considered above, the scenario of a track-and-monitor conspiracy using large-scale 
data analytics can no longer be under-estimated. In practice, this would require consideration of 
the effects of the conspiracy in B2C rather than B2B markets. While the traditional conspiracy 
relies on exchanges of information from competitors, the new model relies on the data gleaned 
from consumers. As machine learning is nothing but a sub-set of ‘gold’ data mining based on 
artificial intelligence (AI) and pattern recognition extracted from such data,49 a better 
understanding of AI is needed rather than a radical overhaul of the existing competition rules. 
Some commentators have suggested moving beyond this by calling for a policy of algorithmic 
transparency.50 It would, indeed, be a welcome development by requiring the source code, 
which is included in the decision-making of an algorithm, to be disclosed. 
Question 7: What tools does competition policy need to deal with issues in the digital economy 
in a sufficiently timely, effective, and far-sighted manner? To what extent are these in place in 
the UK? 
The best regulatory tool is to offer timely guidance outlining a few principles and explaining 
how the digital markets require a nuanced approach, whenever necessary, to data that have an 
economic significance to consumers and disclosures about the larger-scale collection of such 
data and big data analytics. At the same time, it is necessary to spell out whether the existing 
tests are sufficiently accommodating of such concerns or entirely dismissive of them as 
unsuitable. Ultimately, the test of the market-foreclosure-exclusionary effect leading to 
consumer harm is the fruit of the competition authority’s contested guidance to businesses and 
                                                          
48 See the report of the World Economic Forum, Rethinking Personal Data: A New Lens for Strengthening 
Trust (May 2014), 
‹http://www3.weforum.org/docs/WEF_RethinkingPersonalData_ANewLens_Report_2014.pdf›, referred 
to by Daniel Greenwood, Arkadiusz Stopczynski, Brian Sweatt, Thomas Hardjono, and Alex Pentland, ‘The 
New Deal on Data: A Framework for Institutional Controls’ in Lane (2014), 198; for a similar recognition, 
see Commission, COMP 39740, Google Search (Shopping), 27 July 2018, published on 18 December 2018, 
which refers to the monetisation of users’ data, paras 158 and 320. 
49 Finley (2014), 213; Chaston (2015), 28, where pattern recognition may reveal hidden relationships that 
can be used for marketing and promotional strategies. 
50 MacCarthy (2018), 64. 
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stakeholders, and not the blueprint of the provisions enacted by the legislator. The guidance 
was intended to provide consistency across various anti-competitive practices and legal 
certainty to businesses, but did not capture new technologies or any recent competition law and 
economic developments in digital markets.  
A. What is the appropriate approach to mergers and takeovers in digital markets – what are the 
key challenges and how should they be addressed? 
The key challenges involve being prepared to recognise and identify the risks associated with 
the large-scale analysis of big data and its economic and strategic importance, including having 
the customers of the merged entity under the microscope for future strategic or tactical pricing 
decisions. In the event that any such transactions would raise competition concerns, the best 
approach is an in-depth investigation followed by conditional commitments to ensure that the 
data would not be combined or subject to large-scale analytics. Exceptionally, one could use the 
public interest merger to consider privacy and surveillance concerns. 
B. What is the appropriate approach to antitrust enforcement (cartels, vertical restraints, and 
abuse of dominance) in digital markets – what are the key challenges and how should they be 
addressed? 
I have referred above to both cartels and abuse of dominance, outlining the adaptation of the 
existing rules and a few new ones. On vertical restraints, it is perhaps too early to suggest 
changes to the framework of analysis of online resales. An initial thought is that examples such 
as Amazon, a growing and reliable channel for the large-scale distribution of various products, 
or Wayfair, an advertising platform for furniture and household products, are notable successful 
business models. Amazon is making short-term losses by under-cutting the original 
manufacturers’ prices, as do many resellers competing aggressively on their discounts offered 
to final consumers. Amazon’s business model is driven by a strategy of attracting even more 
customers to the distribution platform alongside investing in logistics. In contrast, Wayfair 
relies on the logistics of the manufacturers, and its discounts are not as high as Amazon’s. Both 
are, however, successful at making deliveries internationally to a segment of consumers who 
prefer foreign brands or products that cannot be purchased locally. The UK should replicate 
similar distribution and advertising platform models to other consumers from elsewhere.  
Question 8: Are there other policy changes beyond traditional competition tools that could 
facilitate entry and thus improve competition and economic outcomes? 
The entry of many other digital start-ups may be pro-actively encouraged by initiatives that 
support innovation and offer funding for pioneering ideas rather than imitators. 
Question 9:  What approaches are being considered and developed by governments and 
competition authorities in other major economies? What needs to be done internationally and 
what can be done at the UK level? 
As mentioned above, the European paternalistic approach to privacy and data protection has 
prevailed over recent initiatives to make data accessible to other market players. While 
competition authorities have further improved their analysis, the sophistication of the digital 
economy and of the internet system in the presence of so many business models cannot follow a 
one-size-fits-all approach to consumer harm.  
